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Abstract 
We discuss the meaning of the concept of implicit pension debt (unfunded pen-
sion liabilities) from a public finance perspective and contrast different definitions 
such a variable with the notion of public debt. We conclude that the implicit pen-
sion is deeply different from public debt but nevertheless is meaningful for eco-
nomic policy. We compute the implicit pension debt associated to retired workers 
for several countries for different years adopting a homogeneous algorithm. Our 
results show that the major countries have implicit pension debt of very different 
size with different trends in the last few years. 
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1. Introduction: what are we talking about? 
The “implicit pension debt” (“unfunded pension liabilities”) consists in the present value of pension 
promises, net of future pension contributions, that are implicit in the current legislation. The litera-
ture on the topic was started by Feldstein (1974) who looked at such a variable from the perspective 
of individuals and introduced a wealth variable (“social security wealth”) arguing that it affects con-
sumption. Such a variable might also affect fertility (Cigno, 1986) and/or human capital accumula-
tion (Werding 2006) and can be used in order to evaluate the distributive effects of pension reforms 
(Beltrametti, 1996; Blanchet and Le Minez, 2008).  
If we look at the same variable from the perspective of a public, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension 
scheme, we get a measure that might be meaningful for public finances both under a traditional 
public budget approach (Castellino 1985, Dornbusch 1999, Holzmann et al. 2001) and under more 
radical approaches such as “net worth” (Boskin 1982, Buiter 1983 and 1985, Eisner and Pieper 
1984, Blejer and Cheasty 1991 and Bohn 1992) and “generational accounting” (Auerbach et al 
1991, 1992). The main analogy between the implicit pension debt associated with the operating of a 
PAYG pension scheme and public debt refers to the fact that in both cases we have a promise to pay 
in the future made by the State. 
More recently, the relevance of implicit pension debt for economic policy has been put forwards 
under several points of view.  
First, it has been argued (Boeri and Tabellini 2004) that traditional public deficit measures embod-
ied - e.g. in the European Stability and Growth Pact - are inadequate when structural pension re-
forms (aimed at reducing the weight of a public PAYG while expanding private fully funded 
schemes) are implemented. The Council of the European Union (2005) received this point of view 
by asserting that “the Council agrees that an excess close to the reference value which reflects the 
implementation of pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, 
fully funded pillar should be considered carefully. Although the implementation of these reforms 
leads to a short-term deterioration of the budgetary position, the long-term sustainability of public 
finances clearly improves.”  
Second, the significance of implicit pension debt for the sustainability of sovereign debt has been 
directly stressed by the highest European authorities. In particular, the European Commission in its 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EU) amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (29 September 2010, p. 5) states 
that the decision of starting an excessive deficit procedure “would need to take into account all the 
factors that are relevant, in particular for the assessment of debt developments, such as whether very 
low nominal growth is hampering debt reduction, together with risk factors linked to the debt struc-
ture, private sector indebtedness and implicit liabilities related to ageing” (emphasis added).  
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Third, leading market players (e.g. Credit Suisse, Market Focus May 24
th
 2010, p. 6) have included 
“pension and health liabilities” among the critical long term factors affecting sovereign debt sus-
tainability. Moody’s (Hampton et al., 2011) has used debt and pension metrics in order to better rate 
U.S. state bonds and asserts that “treating pension liabilities as a form of debt, and combining the 
unfunded amount with outstanding indebtedness, improves transparency by providing a more com-
plete comparison of states based on their total long-term obligations as a portion of available reve-
nue and taxing capacity” (p. 2). Much on the same line, Munnell et al. (2011) find that unfunded 
pension liabilities have a significant, albeit modest, effect on the spread of bond yields of U.S 
states. 
In this paper we discuss the possible meanings of pension debt from a public finance perspective 
and provide estimates for a few industrial countries by using a homogeneous algorithm. We restrict 
to the pension debt that considers only pension promises made to current retirees (see Appendix for 
a discussion of possible definitions of pension debt). This latter choice has five main motivations: i) 
future payments are totally unconditional (no social security contributions are due) and thus we deal 
with a variable that is closer to public debt; ii) the political cost of reforms that modify already go-
ing pension payments are much higher than those of reforms affecting retirement age and/or rules 
for determining the amount of pension benefits
1
; iii) measurement is more accurate since we do not 
have to make assumptions about future labour incomes, employment rates, future contribution rates, 
age at retirement
2
, accrual rate for future benefits; furthermore, a shorter time horizon implies that 
hypotheses about discount rate are less decisive; iv) by limiting our analysis to retired workers we 
make our data more comparable cross country since active workers in different countries may be 
subject to different probabilities of pension reform before they retire; v) by limiting our estimates to 
the pension debt held by retirees, we shortcut all the controversies about the pension debt definition 
to be used (see Appendix) since all definitions coincide as far as retirees are concerned. 
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 The rationale for this could be that retirees have very limited room for adjusting their work supply and for smoothing 
their consumptions inter-temporally; furthermore, they have a full perception of the effects of pension reform cutting 
their benefits and therefore make a much stronger opposition to it than active workers do to pension reforms that affect 
their future entitlements. It is no surprise that among dozen of pension reforms that occurred in the last decades around 
the world only very few affected retired people. By analyzing the key features of major pension reforms that occurred 
since 1990 in 21 countries, Whiteford and Whitehouse (2006) show that only in five cases countries have cut ongoing 
pension benefits through a change in the indexation of the pensions in payment (Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy and 
Poland); to our knowledge, only Greece was forced to cut running pension benefits (above a given amount) under the 
pressure of 2009 sovereign debt crisis. Also from the juridical point of view, once the payment of pension has been 
started, the retirees have a fully accrued individual right to it: under many constitutional frameworks this right receives 
a much stronger protection than the accrued to date rights held by workers. Also “verbal” attitudes are consistent with 
our approach: in the case of public debt and of the pension debt of retirees any, even minor, unilateral  change in rules is 
labelled as “default”; on the contrary, changes in rules affecting future benefits are currently labelled as “pension re-
form”. 
2
 The measurement of pension debt of the active workers implies therefore the use of (dynamic) micro-simulation mod-
els (see e.g. Mazzaferro and Morciano, 2008; Werding 2006; Blanchet and Le Minez 2008). 
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In the case of retirees, the amount of future benefits to be paid and the time of payment are well 
defined, unconditional and more robust from both the legal and the political point of view: this 
makes the notion of pension debt closest to that of public debt. Indeed, what makes the public debt 
“special” from the public finance perspective (in contrast with other commitments to future expend-
itures) is the fact that it involves sovereign promises that are jointly unconditional and precisely 
defined.  
In sum, we will deal only with the pension debt held by retirees
3
 for both conceptual reasons (it’s a 
variable that is more relevant for public finances) and for practical reasons (we get more precise and 
uncontroversial measures). 
The size of both the public debt and of pension debt offer a measure of the size of resources the 
State has to withdraw from the private sector (in form of taxes and/or pension contributions and/or 
new debt issues) in order to comply with promises made in the past; for any given level of future 
income growth, the implicit pension debt to GDP ratio gives a measure of the size of the tax wedge 
that has to be imposed on young generations in order to comply with promises already made to the 
elderly4. 
However, even if the similarities between pension debt and public debt are significant, there are 
fundamental differences between the two: 
a) while the subscription of public debt voluntarily occurs on markets, “subscription” of pen-
sion debt (i.e. the payment of pension contribution that will lead to the pension benefit) is 
compulsory. Nevertheless (Castellino, 1985) in both cases as the payments of debt come 
due, the state has the option to meet the cash requirements by issuing new debt or by extin-
guishing it by means of taxation. 
b) The pension debt is not tradable; thus, we cannot use prices in order to learn about agent’s 
expectations. The impossibility of arbitrage implies that the State can give different rates of 
return to different groups of agents; there is also the possibility for the State of selectively 
repudiating the outstanding liabilities (see Bohn, 1992). 
c) The pension debt is affected by life expectancy while of course public debt is not. 
d) While the stock of public debt necessarily is the result of past deficits, this is not the case of 
pension debt: the latter exists even in a hypothetical country in which a public PAYG pen-
sion scheme has always been balanced since its inception.  
Points a) and b) jointly imply that the pension debt is totally held by residents and that the condi-
tions for its renewal do not depend on market conditions. 
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  For Switzerland and Sweden only old-age and disability pensions (for the former) and old-age (for the latter) are 
considered. 
4 Of course, the size of the tax wedge has implications that go beyond public finance and affect firms’ location decisions 
and workers’ choices about regular/irregular labor market participation. 
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As first noted by Samuelson (1958), a PAYG pension scheme plays an economic role that exhibits 
important analogies with the role of fiat money: both money and a PAYG allow agents to transfer 
consumption intertemporally and both institutions work as long as each generation conforms to 
them on the expectation that also the following will. While both pension liabilities and fiat money 
rest to some extent on the State enforcing them with its power, on the contrary the public debt arises 
when the State decides not to use its very own power of collecting taxes and printing money. In the 
case of both pension liabilities and fiat money there is a form of seignorage that is exploited  by the 
State: in the case of pensions the Government gains the gratitude of the first generation of retirees 
(who did not pay social security taxes during their working lives), in the case of fiat money the sto-
ry is well known. While the dynamics of both pension liabilities and money is pro-cyclical (see Fact 
1 in the Appendix), on the contrary the dynamics of the public debt tends to be anti-cyclical. 
In sum, even in a perfectly balanced PAYG scheme the pension debt is positive for all parameter 
values (see Appendix); its size is not a direct measure of the financial sustainability: it simply offers 
a measure of how costly is going to be to meet past pension promises. In other words, the size of the 
pension debt gives a measure of the perspective distortionary effects of the tax wedge associated 
with the working of a PAYG pension scheme. A deficit (surplus) in a PAYG system does not imply 
that pension liabilities are rising (decreasing) and vice versa (see Fact 3 Appendix). 
 
2. Measurement issues 
In general, from the point of view of its measurement, the pension debt can be divided into the 
component associated with active workers and the one associated with retirees. 
As we have said above, when we limit our calculation to the pension debt held by already retired 
persons, the measurement is simple since the current benefit is known and the only uncertainty re-
fers to indexation and expected life duration.  
The computation of pension debt consists in calculating the present value at year t of pension bene-
fits whose right can be claimed by those who already receive a pension:  
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where B is the average amount of benefits for individuals of gender s and age a in year t; P is the 
number of such benefits, vs,a,t is the (country specific) expected residual life of the individuals of 
gender s, at age a, at time t and r is the discount factor. We take five years age cohorts (except the 
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last one that includes all the individuals with more than 95 years) and attribute to individuals in 
each cohort the corresponding median age5 (for the last cohort we attribute a median age of 97). 
We refer to all kind of pensions (old age, disability, ...) currently being paid under the national 
PAYG scheme(s). 
We consider before tax benefits: of course, this assumption implies a substantial over-estimation of 
financial burden for the State but makes our measures independent from assumptions about the ex-
istence of other revenues or about family composition; note that even in traditional public debt liter-
ature the fact that the State taxes interests is neglected. Our measures are overestimated also be-
cause, for lack of data, the same expected residual life is applied for those individuals that receive a 
disability pension even if it is known that disabled people have shorter life expectations. However, 
these two sources overestimation are partially balanced by the fact that we do not consider future 
pensions payable to surviving spouses. We are not able to give a measure of the overall, net effect 
of these assumptions. 
  
3. Results  and conclusions 
We consider nine countries and we are able to consider changes across time for Italy (1999-2007), 
USA (1990-2008), Germany (2003-2009) and United Kingdom (2003-2010).  
Our computations show a wide range of values for the pension debt /GDP ratio. In the scenario with 
no discounting (Table 1A), it varies from 41% (USA, 1990) to 250% (Italy 1999); as we said above, 
such figures alone do not imply any judgment on the financial sustainability of  a PAYG pension 
scheme: they simply reflect different sizes of public PAYG schemes. Values of pension debt to pub-
lic debt ratios range from 74% (USA, 1990) to 447% (Finland, 2008). The share of pension debt 
held by women ranges from 42.4% (USA, 2003) to 60.2% (New Zealand, 2006); this latter ratio 
depends jointly on female labour force participation rates, gender differentials in wages, age at re-
tirement and life expectations. Duration has a minimum of 7.9 years in Sweden (2008) and a maxi-
mum of 14.8 years in New Zealand (2006).  
For Italy and USA we have observation over a relatively long time spell. In Italy, over the 1999-
2007 period the pension debt to GDP ratio has decreased (from 250% to 242%) while duration has 
slightly increased. In the USA over the period 1990-2008 the pension debt to GDP has increased 
from 41% to 67% while duration increased from 8.6 to 10.2. 
For 3 countries (USA, Germany, UK) we have observations for the period 2003-2008. We note that 
the pension debt to GDP ratio decreased in Germany by 32 percentage points; on the contrary, it 
increased in the USA and the UK by, respectively 11 and 7 percentage points. Duration shortens in 
                                                
5 This implies a (minor) over-estimation when a discount rate is used.   
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all countries but the USA and the share of pension debt held by women decreases in Germany while 
increases in the USA and the UK.  
Table 2 gives an insight of the determinants of changes in value of implicit pension debt: life expec-
tancies, the number of beneficiaries (both in absolute and in % of population) increases in all the 
countries considered; the increase in the number of beneficiaries in the USA is noticeable. On the 
contrary, other variables move in different direction in different countries: the generosity of the 
pension schemes (average pension benefit/per capita GDP) increases in the USA and UK while de-
creases in Italy and Germany; the share of beneficiaries over both 65 and 75 increases in all coun-
tries but the USA; similarly, the average pension benefit of retirees over 65 grows (with respect to 
average benefit) in  USA and declines in UK and Germany; the symmetric occurs when retirees 75+ 
are considered.  
The choice of a discount factor for pension liabilities is very controversial6; in Table 1B a factor 
equal to the yield of the 10 years government bonds is introduced: the size of the fall in the pension 
debt depends on national interest rates, the age and gender distribution of beneficiaries and the rela-
tive amount of benefits by age and gender. According to these factors, two facts are noticeable and 
both are due to a dramatic fall in interest rates in the national bond market. The duration of UK pen-
sion debt increases in the period 2003-2010 (it shortens with no discounting). Since women have 
longer life expectation than men, discounting tends to reduce their share of pension debt; similarly 
discounting has stronger effect where the benefits of the older beneficiaries are relatively high. This 
occurs in all countries but the UK because of the particular structure of benefits by age and gender. 
In general, it is not possible to compare our results with the ones obtained in previous studies7. The 
only possibility is the comparison of our results with those by Van den Noord and Herd (1993) for 
the pension debt of retirees for USA 1990. Such a comparison is very encouraging since the pension 
debt/GDP ratio with no discounting is almost the same (42% in Van den Noord and Herd work and 
41% in ours).  
                                                
6 Brown and Wilcox (2009) argue that an ideal discount rate for pension liabilities should be derived from securities 
that deliver cash flows that are fully taxable, with high degree of assurance, that are traded in markets without extraor-
dinary liquidity characteristics and that are free of flight-to quality effects. It is not obvious however to identify a securi-
ty with all those characteristics and scholars often use values taken from the yield of medium or long term government 
bonds: e.g. Gokhale and Smetters (2003, p. 23) use a discount rate of 3.6% “corresponding to the average yield on thir-
ty-year Treasury bonds during the past several years”. Since in this paper we deal only with the pension debt of retired 
persons, it seems appropriate to refer to 10 year government bonds; furthermore, this maturity closely matches the aver-
age durations of retirees pension debt (see Tables 1A and 1B).  
7 There are several reasons for that: first, methodology is different (e.g. Van den Noord and Herd, 1993, use the genera-
tional accounting computation or Brugiavini, 1987, considers a sample survey on family budgets); secondly, the dis-
aggregation between retirees and active workers is often not detailed. Moreover, some author takes into account only 
particular schemes (for example, Castellino 1985 and Beltrametti 1996 consider only private sector pension schemes). 
Finally, previous estimations are quite old and our results are instead referred to the last available year for data with the 
needed detail. 
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Finally, note that the level of data aggregation has a substantial effect on results. For instance, we 
use specific data on pension benefit for each age and gender: when we use (as it is done in most of 
the previous literature) aggregated data that do not take into account differences in benefit for dif-
ferent cohorts then the differences in results are sizeable (see Table 3). In particular such differences 
are in the order of 10% in the case of Italy and UK. 
The important differences in the size of the pension debt that we have found suggest that the tax 
wedge associated with the working of the PAYG pension schemes are going to be substantially dif-
ferent across the considered countries. Huge distributive and efficiency implications follow.  
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Table 1A: Implicit pension debt (only retirees) with no discounting  
COUNTRY Year 
PENSION DEBT 
(national curren-
cy, bn) 
PENSION 
DEBT/GDP % 
PENSION 
DEBT/PUBLIC 
DEBT % 
DURATION 
(years) 
PENSION DEBT 
HELD BY FE-
MALE POPULA-
TION 
ITALY 
2007 3741 242 234 10.3 44.9% 
2003 3108 233 223 10.5 45.1% 
1999 2819 250 220 10.2 45.7% 
USA  
2008 8888 67 102 10.2 44.7% 
2003 6298 56 93 10.2 42.4% 
1990 2387 41 74 8.6 42.5% 
UK 
2010 1918 142 169 13.1 55.3% 
2008 2154 149 286 13.4 54.7% 
2003 1614 142 368 13.7 52.7% 
GERMANY 
2009 2829 118 161 8.4 51.3% 
2008 2781 111 169 8.5 51.5% 
2003 2548 143 175 8.7 51.7% 
FINLAND 2008 282 152 447 9.8 51.3% 
SWEDEN 2008 4176 153 395 7.9 46.1% 
SWITZERLAND* 2005 196 44 115 10.6 54.1% 
DENMARK* 2010 284 124 305 10.7 56.9% 
NEW ZEALAND* 2006 82 78 267 14.8 60.2% 
Source: our computations on national data.  
* Average pension benefit by age not available: we use the average benefit by gender 
 
Table 1B: Implicit pension debt (only retirees) with 10 year national bonds discounting 
COUNTRY Year 
PENSION DEBT 
(national curren-
cy, bn) 
PENSION 
DEBT/GDP % 
PENSION 
DEBT/PUBLIC 
DEBT % 
DURATION 
(years) 
PENSION DEBT 
HELD BY FE-
MALE POPULA-
TION 
ITALY 
2007 3046 197 191 9.2 44.4% 
2003 2574 193 185 9.5 44.6% 
1999 2032 180 158 8.8 45.0% 
USA  
2008 7309 55 84 9.3 44.2% 
2003 4935 44 73 9.1 41.9% 
1990 2056 35 64 8 42.2% 
UK 
2010 1837 136 162 12.7 55.4% 
2008 2125 147 282 13.4 54.7% 
2003 1082 95 246 10.2 53.1% 
GERMANY 
2009 2289 95 130 7.7 50.7% 
2008 2362 95 144 7.9 51.0% 
2003 1938 109 133 7.7 50.9% 
FINLAND 2008 277 150 440 9.7 51.2% 
SWEDEN 2008 3691 135 349 7.6 45.8% 
SWITZERLAND* 2005 175 39 102 10.2 53.8% 
DENMARK* 2010 273 119 294 10.4 56.9% 
NEW ZEALAND* 2006 54 51 176 10.9 58.2% 
Source: our computations on national data.  
* Average pension benefit by age not available: we use the average benefit by gender 
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Table 2: Main figures behind pension debt 
COUNTRY Year 
Life expec-
tations at 67 
(males) 
Life expec-
tations at 67 
(females) 
Average 
pension 
benefit/per 
capita gdp 
Beneficia-
ries per 
100 inha-
bitants 
% benefi-
ciaries 65+ 
% beneficia-
ries 75 + 
Average  
pension bene-
fit 
75+/average 
pension  
benefit 
ITALY 
2007 16.34 19.85 0.53 28.4 52.7% 6.4% 1.04 
2003 15.32 18.90 0.52 28.5 48.91% 16.08% 1.05 
1999 14.75 18.36 0.57 27.4 44.50% 13.80% 1.03 
USA  
2008 17 19.70 0.31 13 60.40% 18.40% 1.03 
2003 16.4 19.20 0.29 12.2 60.07% 19.97% 1.01 
1990 13.2 17.10 0.29 10.9 66.10% 18.60% 0.95 
UK 
2010 16.03 18.58 0.27 30.9 50.50% 17.20% 1.04 
2008 16.21 18.63 0.27 31.3 48.97% 16.76% 1.04 
2003 14.85 17.50 0.27 30 46.75% 15.18% 1.03 
GERMANY 
2009 16.1 18.70 0.34 25 75.40% 24.30% 1.07 
2008 16.09 19.00 0.32 24.8 74.29% 22.78% 1.06 
2003 15.7 18.50 0.45 23.7 62.70% 17.80% 1.04 
FINLAND 2008 16.03 19.65 0.38 24.7 56.10% 14.60% 0.90 
SWEDEN 2008 16.5 19.30 0.52 21.6 82.70% 22.90% 0.93 
SWITZER-
LAND* 
2005 16.8 17.50 0.3 8.1 49.70% 12.40% 1.00 
DENMARK* 2010 15.51 17.84 0.37 15.7 59.70% 16.80% 1.00 
NEW  
ZEALAND* 
2006 16.42 18.98 0.24 16.8 46.30% 15.10% 1.00 
Source: our computations on national data.  
* Average pension benefit by age not available: we use the average benefit by gender 
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Table 3: Differences between measures of the pension debt when using specific 
benefits for each gender and cohort (as in equation 1) and when using average ben-
efit for all cohorts. 
COUNTRY 
DIFFERENCE BY PENSION 
DEBT§ (no discounting) 
ABSOLUTE DIF-
FERENCE BE-
TWEEN DURA-
TION§ (no discount-
ing) 
PENSION DEBT WITH 
REAL DISCOUNT 
RATE=10 YEARS 
COUNTRY BOND (PD 
with zero discount-
ing=100) 
ITALY 2007 9% 2 81.4 
USA 2008 3% 0.4 82.2 
UNITED KINGDOM 2010 11% 1.8 95.9 
GERMANY 2009 4% 0.4 80.9 
FINLAND 2008 4% 1.3 98.2 
SWEDEN 2008 4% 0.4 88.4 
SWITZERLAND 2005 - - 88.8 
DENMARK 2010 - - 96.1 
NEW ZEALAND 2006 - - 65.8 
Source: our computations on national data 
§ Measure of the size of the overestimation (+) or underestimation (-) that occurs when the computation is done using 
average pension benefit by gender with no differentiation by age group. 
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APPENDIX:  The simple arithmetic of pension liabilities 
 
Three definitions of Social Security Wealth (SSW) and, symmetrically, implicit pension liabilities 
are most commonly used in the literature8: a) the net SSW for the closed group of those who are 
currently retired or in the labour force; b) the net SSW for the open group of all born and unborn 
generations; c) the accrued to date SSW9.  
Definition "a". This definition was suggested by Feldstein (1974: pp. 911): “Gross social security 
wealth... is the present value in year t of the retirement benefits which could eventually be claimed 
by all who are either in the labour force or already retired in year t... Net social security wealth... 
equals gross social security wealth minus the present value of the social security taxes to be paid by 
those who are currently in the labour force”.  
Definition "b".  The net SSW for the open group of all born and unborn generations is equal to the 
net SSW for the closed group of those who are currently retired or in the labour force (definition 
"a") plus  the present value of the social security benefits to which those who will join the labour 
force in the future (even if not yet born) will be entitled, net of the social security taxes they will 
have to pay. 
Definition "c".  The accrued to date SSW restricts the calculation to the present value of the part of 
future pension benefits the right to whom has already been fully acquired10.   
The differences among these definitions can be traced back to different underlying interpretations of 
the concept of vested pension right (see Beltrametti 1996); the choice of the "best" definition obvi-
ously depends on the purpose of the analysis.  
 
A very simple model 
Let us consider a deterministic economy with three overlapping generations. In each period t 
21
,
tt
pp  and 
3
t
p  agents belonging to generation 1, 2 and 3, respectively, live. Agents work in period 
1 and 2 of their lives receiving a wage W and being subject to a social security tax rateτ ; during 
period 3 they are retired and receive a pension benefit B. Population and wage grow, respectively, at 
rate n andω : by assuming that ω  is exogenously given we assume that SSW does not affect capital 
accumulation and growth.  
 
Net and gross pension liabilities (definition “a”) 
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where r is the discount rate that we take to be equal to the real interest rate. The first three terms 
correspond to the Feldstein's Gross SSW and the term in square bracket is the present value of the 
social security taxes to be paid by those who are currently in the labour force. 
 
Pension liabilities according to definition "b" 
 
It is useful to rewrite (2) as follows: 
ttt
XDPLa +=                    
where: 
                                                
8 See, Castellino (1985), Van den Noord and Herd (1993, 1994). 
9 The discussion that follows will make it clear in this case it is irrelevant whether you refer to the closed group of those who are 
currently retired or in the labour force or to the open group of all born and unborn generations.  
10 It is the sum of the benefits to which those who are currently retired are entitled and the present value of future benefits which 
could eventually be claimed by each worker taken in the proportion in which she has already paid the total social security taxes 
that will entitle her to an old age pension; no deduction of future social security taxes is made. 
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 is the current deficit of the pension scheme in time t and  
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is a term that contains the present values of payments that concern generations alive in period t but 
that will occur in t+1 and t+2. Similarly, if we consider not only the generations living in t but also 
those living in all periods from t to t+m we have11: 
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Accrued to date pension liabilities (definition "c") 
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That is, we compute the right to receive a pension benefit that has been already fully acquired by 
the old generation and we compute half the benefit to be received at the end of the following period 
by the middle age generation. 
 
A perfectly balanced scheme 
Let us assume that the pension scheme is perfectly balanced, i.e. that in each period the social secu-
rity taxes paid by the workers equal the pension benefits paid to the retirees; we take τ  as an exog-
enously given constant and thus have to assume that tB  is endogenously determined so that the 
budget constraint is met: 
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Under the assumption that the system is perfectly balanced and noticing that  
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11 Of course, in case people know that the system will be terminated in some future time, we have to assume that some  working 
generations are forced to pay contributions even if  it is known that they will  not receive any pension benefit; in our framework 
this would be equivalent to assuming that such generations do not pay social security taxes but finance current retirees consump-
tion out  of general taxation: all the resources are produced by the working generations while the extension of social security does  
not  affect he size of current and future output . 
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A trivial non-negativity condition for population, wage and the present value of wage and pension 
benefits implies that 1−>ω , 1−>n , 1−>r  and that therefore 0>k . Of course, since k  is the ratio 
between the growth rate of the economy and the interest rate, its value being lower than 1 character-
izes an economy being dynamically efficient (see below). 
 
Fact 1: in a perfectly balanced PAYG system, both net and accrued to date pension liabilities are 
positive for all admissible parameter values. 
 
Thus, the very existence and the size of pension liabilities have nothing to do with the sustainability 
of the scheme12. Note that net pension liabilities consider the payments that the same agents make 
and receive in different periods of time while the possible net burden to public finances has to do 
with the payments that different generations make and receive in the same periods of time. The 
gross definition is a useful measure of the cost of future pension benefits payments.  
Also note (equations 2, 3, 4) that, since under all the definitions unfunded pension liabilities 
are increasing with W, τ , ω  and n , pension liabilities are procyclical, and decrease as population 
growth slows down. International comparison of the size of unfunded pension liabilities (see, e.g. 
World Bank, 1994, p. 139; Disney, 2000, Table 1 and in Tables 1A and 1B in this paper) have no 
value in signalling different levels of current or perspective pressure on public finances. It would be 
so only if all the national schemes shared the same parameters values. For instance large differences 
in contribution rates imply large differences in pension liabilities even among perfectly balanced 
schemes. It seems also misleading to argue (Hemming, 1998, p15) that “the size of this unfunded 
pension liabilities would indicate the extent to which future contribution rates have to be increased 
to meet future pension payments”. The size of pension debt simply signals the size of the tax wedge 
that will occur in the future because of past pension promises. 
 
Fact 2: In a perfectly balanced PAYG net pension liabilities for all born and unborn generations are 
positive only if 1>k , that is, if the economy is dynamically inefficient; indeed: 
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12 This fact is discussed by Franco (1995).  
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Note from eq. 3 that if 1<k  then pension liabilities according to the definition "b" are the sum of 
the present values of all the future deficits implicit in the current design of the pension scheme: by 
definition, in a balanced scheme this sum is zero. 
 
An unbalanced scheme 
Let us consider an unbalanced scheme: from equations 2 and 3 we get the expression of changes in 
value of pension liabilities (definitions “a” and “b”) from time t and t+1: 
  
 
where 
 
 
that is, the change in the value of pension liabilities under definition “a” from time t to time t+1 
depends on the “issuing” of new debt (see the first squared bracket) plus a term (see the second 
squared bracket) that says that if population and wages grow, than liabilities decrease since the State 
expects greater contributions in the future minus the part of debt that is reimbursed (see last term). 
 
For definition “c” we get 
 
 
 
That is, the change in the value of pension liabilities under definition “c” from time t to time t+1 is 
given by the old generation acquiring the right to the “second half” of the pension benefit (first 
squared bracket) plus the middle age generation acquiring the right to the first half of the pension 
benefit (second squared bracket) minus the reimbursement of the pension debt towards the previous 
old generation. 
Since the pension scheme runs a current deficit if: 
 
we see that: 
 
Fact 3: A deficit (surplus) in a PAYG system does not imply that pension liabilities are rising (de-
creasing) and viceversa. 
 
Indeed this is a very intuitive result: think at a PAYG that is being closed down: a current deficit is 
associated with declining pension liabilities; on the contrary, in early stages of a new PAYG current 
surpluses are associated with increasing pension liabilities. Nevertheless, it is often argued that 
changes in pension liabilities have to do with sustainability: for instance the European Central Bank 
(ECB 2000, p. 63) states that “the improvements in current primary balances required to prevent an 
unstainable build up of public pension liabilities have been estimated to be substantial”. 
The very fact a PAYG is unbalanced does not imply that pension liabilities increase.  
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Few other facts in a balanced PAYG 
 
One could like to take into account the social security taxes paid by the living generation before 
time t and could ask what is the net worth  of the participation in the PAYG scheme for all the liv-
ing and future generations as a whole (NSSWL&F). Let us start by assuming that the pension sys-
tem will be terminated with certainty in some future period t+m. In this case13 we have: 
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that is, we have to subtract from mttPla +,   the present values of both the payments that would have 
been made and received hadn't the system been closed in time t+m and the payments that the living 
generations have made before time t. 
 
Fact 4:  Under the assumption that the system is perfectly balanced the net worth of the participa-
tion in the PAYG scheme for all the living and future generations as a whole is negative 
for all the admissible values of k .  
 
Indeed the sum of first two terms on the right end side of (6) gives zero while the term in squared 
brackets is positive. The same result occurs if we assume that the pension scheme's duration is infi-
nite. In other words, once the first generation that receives the benefits without having paid contri-
butions at the start of the system has gone, the participation in the system for the remaining genera-
tions has always negative sum14.  As is well known, the very existence of a PAYG may therefore 
appear puzzling15.  
 
Fact 5: if our PAYG scheme is perfectly balanced, then: 
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Pension liabilities and dynamic efficiency 
 
Since the deterministic economy we are considering  grows at a rate  nn ωωγ ++= ,  we note that  
k  is greater  (lower) than 1 only if the growth rate of the economy is greater (lower) than the rate of 
interest. In other terms, 1<k  implies that the economy is dynamically efficient; in other terms,  
1<k  implies that the PAYG offers  a rate of return on contributions that is lower than market (risk-
less by definition) investments. Of course in the real world uncertainty about returns and adminis-
trative costs might question this fact. 
The pension liabilities associated with the generation that is entering the labour force (generation 1) 
are: 
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
+
−−⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
+
≡ ++ 12
2
11
1
1
1
1
ttttt
W
r
WB
r
PPLa ττ  
 
                                                
13 It is well known that in such a case rational backwards induction will prevent the PAYG scheme from surviving.  
14 This result is well known: see e.g. Bohn (1992, p. 44); in the case the economy has an infinite duration, it can been noted that 
(obviously) a negative but finite figure divided among an infinite number of generations still gives a zero burden to each of them. 
15 See, e.g. Tabellini (1991, 2000) and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000).  
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plugging (5) we get  
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or  
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Since both k  and 
n
n
+
+
1
2
 are positive, for a balanced PAYG we have the following:  
 
Fact 6: if a PAYG is perfectly balanced and the economy is dynamically efficient then new   gener-
ations get a negative value from the participation to the scheme (when the discount factor is 
the market interest rate).   
 
Fact 7: if you know that the economy is dynamically efficient, and then  0
1
>PLa   implies that   
the system is not sustainable. 
 
 
